

Message Text

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EXDIS, FOR S/P DIRECTOR LAKE ONLY FROM KREISBERG & MSPIEGEL

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SUBJECT: JAPAN LETTER

1. FOLLOWING IS REVISED DRAFT OF LETTER TO YUKIO. ALAN ROMBERG HAS CLEARED IT. WE KNOW YOU WILL WANT TO MAKE IT LESS FORMAL, AND TO PUT IT IN YOUR OWN WORDS.

2. DEAR YUKIO: I WANTED TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE PLANNING TALKS TO GET BACK TO YOU ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSED TRIP TO AFRICA. THE TALKS WENT VERY WELL. THEY WERE BOTH INSTRUCTIVE AND OPEN. WE FULLY EXPLORED MANY AREAS WHERE THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN CAN COOPERATE PRODUCTIVELY, AS WELL AS SOME WHERE OUR APPROACHES DIFFER. I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE THOROUGHNESS OF OUR DISCUSSION OF AFRICAN ISSUES.

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3. FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA'S PROPOSED TRIP TO AFRICA IS MOST TIMELY. I BELIEVE IT WILL BE OF GREAT BENEFIT TO BOTH JAPAN AND THE AFRICAN NATIONS, AS WELL AS HELP OUR OWN NEGOTIATING EFFORTS. JAPAN SHARES MANY OF THE UNITED STATES' INTERESTS IN EXPANDING RELATIONS WITH AFRICA. AFRICA IS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT SOURCE OF RAW MATERIALS. IT PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. JAPAN ALSO SHARES MANY OF THE

UNITED STATES' ADVANTAGES IN SEEKING CLOSER TIES WITH AFRICA -- YOUR ABILITY TO SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH TRADE, AID AND INVESTMENT; YOUR IMPORTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY; YOUR NOT HAVING BEEN A COLONIAL POWER; YOUR SUPPORT FOR CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

4. AMERICAN AND JAPANESE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH AFRICA CAN REINFORCE EACH OTHER IN THREE MAJOR POLICY AREAS: THE SEARCH FOR EARLY, NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA; SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; AND THE EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE MAJOR POWER COMPETITION ON THE CONTINENT.

5. OUTSIDE COUNTRIES' RELATIONS WITH ALL THE NATIONS OF AFRICA ARE GREATLY AFFECTED BY THEIR POLICIES ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. OUR OWN POLICY IS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT CHANGE IS COMING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THAT WE HAVE A PROFOUND INTEREST IN ITS COMING PEACEFULLY. WE MUST THEREFORE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO HELP BRING ABOUT JUST NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS AND TO AVOID ESCALATING RACIAL CONFLICT. OUR ACTIVE PURSUIT OF THESE GOALS HAS BROUGHT SOME PROGRESS AND HAS GREATLY STRENGTHENED OUR TIES WITH THE NATIONS OF AFRICA.

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6. IN NAMIBIA, SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSALS. ALTHOUGH SOUTH AFRICA HAS ANNOUNCED ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS, ITS RAID INTO ANGOLA IN MAY HAS EXACERBATED SWAPO'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE LOCATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN THE NORTH DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. HOWEVER, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE FRONT LINE STATES AND SWAPO'S DECISION AT LUANDA TO CONTINUE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. OUR REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE MEETING WITH THE PARTIES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, HOPING TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD A FINAL AGREEMENT THAT CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

7. IN RHODESIA, THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS THAT EACH SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST ON DOMINATING THE TRANSITION ,ROCESS IN A WAY THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER AND WOULD MAKE FAIR ELECTIONS IMPOSSIBLE. NEVERTHELESS, NEITHER SIDE HAS CLOSED THE DOOR TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES. AT THIS TIME, BRITISH AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES ARE TALKING WITH THE PARTIES SEPARATELY, TRYING TO BRING THEM CLOSER TOGETHER ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. IN SEEKING TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT BY ALL

PARTIES TO A SETTLEMENT, WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR OWN NEUTRALITY. TO SIDE EITHER WITH THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT OR WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BE TO ABANDON ALL HOPE OF A NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF THIS GROWING CONFLICT.

8. EARLY IN THE ADMINISTRATION, THE QUESTION AROSE WHETHER THE UNITED STATES COULD PRESS FOR CHANGE WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA, AND AT THE SAME TIME SECURE SOUTH AFRICA'S COOPERATION ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE GROWING CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT BE IGNORED, AND THAT ALL THREE PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAS SHOWN THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL COOPERATE ON RHODESIA
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AND NAMIBIA DESPITE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF APARTHEID, BECAUSE OF ITS OWN INTEREST IN AVOIDING SERIOUS CONFLICT IN THE REGION.

9. WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TO SOUTH AFRICA THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE BOUND TO DETERIORATE IF THERE IS NOT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD FULL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND AN END TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. AS THE CRISIS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA GROWS, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION WILL REQUIRE THAT THOSE TIES BE TERMINATED WHICH MIGHT BE SUPPORTIVE OF APARTHEID. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR OWN STRONG INTEREST IN SEEING THE PEACEFUL CHANGE THAT WOULD PREVENT THIS DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS, AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT GENUINE PROGRESS. WE RECOGNIZE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM, THE DIFFICULTY OF CHANGE, AND THE NEED FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO DECIDE TOGETHER THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE, RATHER THAN OUTSIDE COUNTRIES DICTATING A TIMETABLE OR BLUEPRINT. WE ARE CONTINUING TO GRAPPLE WITH DIFFICULT QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO USE WHAT LEVERAGE WE HAVE TO EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE RACIAL EQUALITY.

10. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS ARE NOT PEACEFULLY RESOLVED, THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE TRAGIC FOR THE REGION AND FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD. AS THE CONFLICT ESCALATES, SOUTH AFRICA IS LIKELY TO BECOME INCREASINGLY INVOLVED ON ONE SIDE, AND THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA ON THE OTHER. ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE REGION WILL DETERIORATE FURTHER. THE IMPACT OF RACIAL CONFLICT ON OUR OWN COUNTRY AND ON MUCH OF THE REST OF THE WORLD COULD BE SERIOUS.

11. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT AFRICAN NATIONS WILL EXPECT JAPAN
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TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE DETAILS OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN NEGOTIATIONS, OR IN FACTIONAL RIVALRIES. HOWEVER, THEY WILL WELCOME JAPAN'S INTEREST IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS AND EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR MAJORITY RULE AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS. JAPAN'S POLICIES ON SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL GREATLY INFLUENCE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH ALL NATIONS ON THE CONTINENT.

12. ONE AREA OF "ACTION" YOU MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WOULD BE A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING ONCE SETTLEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED, AS WELL AS ASSISTING THE NEW NATIONS AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THE WILLINGNESS JAPAN HAS EXPRESSED TO PROVIDE NON-TROOP SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPING IN NAMIBIA WILL BE WELCOMED BY THE AFRICAN NATIONS. BOTH NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE. IN NAMIBIA PARTICULARLY, EDUCATIONAL AND CAREER OPPORTUNITIES FOR AFRICANS HAVE BEEN PRACTICALLY NON-EXISTENT. WE HAVE INCLUDED A ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND IN THE UK/US RHODESIA PROPOSALS. A SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT BY OUTSIDE DONORS WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES, ACCESS TO LAND, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR BLACKS IN RHODESIA. RAPIDLY IMPROVING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR ALL WOULD OFFER THE BEST HOPE THAT THE SETTLEMENT REACHED WILL BE STABLE AND LASTING. I THINK THESE AREA; OF NEED ARE ONES YOU MAY WANT TO EXPLORE.

13. UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA HAS GROWN SUBSTANTIALLY FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS. THE NEW FOCUS IN ALL OF OUR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IS ON THE NEEDS OF THE SMALL FARMERS WHO MAKE UP THE MAJORITY OF THE WORLD'S POOR. CONSISTENT WITH THIS, GREATER ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE LEAST DEVELOPED, MOST RURAL CONTINENT. THE DROUGHT IN THE SAHEL REQUIRED NOT ONLY A MASSIVE EMERGENCY RELIEF EFFORT, BUT A LONG-TERM MULTINATIONAL RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AS WELL. FINALLY, THE UPHEAVALS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED TRANSPORTATION FOR

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MANY COUNTRIES (E.G., ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA), HAVE PLACED OTHER SEVERE STRAINS ON THE ECONOMIES IN THE REGION, AND HAVE CREATED VAST REFUGEE AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE NEEDS. MUCH OF OUR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA IS FOCUSED IN THESE AREAS.

14. I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED HOW JAPAN MIGHT EXPRESS

CONCERN FOR THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, AND A WILLINGNESS TO BE OF HELP ONCE SETTLEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED. IN ADDITION, REFUGEE ASSISTANCE IS BADLY NEEDED AND CAN EFFECTIVELY GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO JAPAN'S SYMPATHY FOR PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

15. ONE IMPORTANT AREA IN WHICH JAPAN MIGHT WANT TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTEREST IN AFRICA IS IN ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL. A HUMANITARIAN INTEREST IN THIS DESPERATELY POOR REGION WOULD GREATLY IMPRESS AFRICAN COUNTRIES. I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE TWO AREAS IN WHICH THE SAHELIAN STATES HAVE ASKED ASSISTANCE

WHERE JAPAN MIGHT BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL: FISHERIES, AND IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE, PARTICULARLY RICE. ON A RELATED ISSUE, I AM CERTAIN THAT AFRICAN NATIONS WELCOMED JAPAN'S GENEROUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE MOST RECENT REPLENISHMENT OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND. THIS DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT NOT ONLY FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT, BUT ALSO FOR PAN-AFRICAN COOPERATION, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED JAPANESE-AFRICAN RELATIONS.

15.A. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASING SOVIET EFFORTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA FOR POLITICAL GAIN. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW'S POLICY IS ILL-CONFIDENTIAL

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CONCEIVED AND WILL ONLY ADD TO THE SOVIET UNION'S LONG-TERM DIFFICULTIES IN SEEKING INFLUENCE ON THE CONTINENT. AFRICAN NATIONS ARE SENSITIVE TO HAVING THEIR PROBLEMS VIEWED IN AN EAST/WEST RATHER THAN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT, AND STRONGLY RESIST BOTH MAJOR POWER CONFRONTATION IN AFRICA AND OUTSIDE DOMINATION.

16. WERE WE TO REACT TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN A PURELY EAST/WEST COMPETITIVE FRAMEWORK, WE WOULD LOSE MUCH OF OUR CREDIBILITY IN SEEKING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE. RATHER, WE RELY PRIMARILY ON CONSTRUCTIVE POLICIES: WORKING WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES, ASSISTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND STRENGTHENING AID, TRADE AND INVESTMENT TIES. WE RESPOND TO LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS OF STATES THREATENED BY MASSIVE BUILDUPS OF FOREIGN ARMS AND TROOPS ON THEIR BORDERS, WHILE PRACTICING RESTRAINT IN ARMS TRANSFERS. WE BELIEVE THESE AFFIRMATIVE POLICIES, AND OUR EFFORTS TO AVOID SERIOUSLY FUELING AFRICAN CONFLICTS, GIVE US THE ADVANTAGE OVER THE SOVIET UNION IN ESTABLISHING CLOSE AND LASTING TIES WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

17. AT THIS TIME OF INCREASING BIPOLAR TENSION ON THE CONTINENT, THE AFRICAN STATES WILL WELCOME JAPAN'S INTEREST IN IMPROVING TIES. AFRICAN STATES HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE BIPOLAR COMPETITION BY DIVERSIFYING THEIR RELATIONS AND REDUCING THEIR DEPENDENCE ON A SINGLE OUTSIDE POWER. FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS FOR MANY OTHERS, THEY WILL WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TIES WITH JAPAN. THEY ARE SENSITIVE TO CONCENTRATION ONLY ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT. THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES CAN DO MUCH TO SUPPORT PEACE, STABILITY AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF AFRICAN STATES BY DEVELOPING CONSTRUCTIVE TIES WITH AFRICA, COOPERATING WITH EACH OTHER WHERE POSSIBLE, YET MAINTAINING SEPARATE STRONG RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN NATIONS.

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18. THE MORE CONSERVATIVE COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR WILL INEVITABLY RAISE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THEIR CONCERNS MIGHT INCLUDE:

-- SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN EFFORTS TO MEDIATE DISPUTES ON THE CONTINENT AND TO REMOVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION;

-- WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE CONSTRUCTIVE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AND TO STRENGTHEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT TIES;

-- SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN-BACKED INITIATIVES IN THE UN TO PEACEFULLY RESOLVE PROBLEMS.

19. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT EVEN THE MORE CONSERVATIVE AFRICAN STATES TEND TO ACCEPT SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT ON THE CONTINENT WHEN IT IS IN SUPPORT OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION OR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF A NATION (AS IN ETHIOPIA). THESE FUNDAMENTAL AFRICAN CONCERNS COME FIRST, EVEN THOUGH OUTSIDE INTERVENTION INCREASINGLY WORRIES MANY STATES.

20. IN DECIDING WHICH COUNTRIES TO VISIT, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD PROBABLY NOT WANT TO VISIT ALL, THE FOREIGN MINISTER MIGHT CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING. TANZANIA AND NIGERIA WOULD BE AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT STOPS.

21. TANZANIA: PROBABLY THE KEY LEADER OF AFRICAN OPINION ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES, TANZANIA HAS BEEN THE MOST ACTIVE AND HELPFUL IN OUR RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS. IT PLAYS A CENTRAL ROLE IN DETERMINING AFRICA BLOC POSITION.
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TIONS AT THE UN. TANZANIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY --FOCUSING ON THE NEEDS OF THE SMALL FARMER--HAS BEEN REGARDED AS A MODEL AND HAS ATTRACTED MUCH FOREIGN ASSISTANCE; BUT THE COUNTRY IS NOT ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT. WHILE SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES WOULD DOMINATE YOUR TALKS IN TANZANIA, NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE RAISED AS WELL.

22. ZAMBIA: ZAMBIA CONTINUES TO PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE ON THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES, PARTICULARLY RHODESIA. IT IS MORE IMMEDIATELY AFFECTED BY THE CONFLICT THAN TANZANIA--ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, AND MILITARILY. IT FACES A REAL CRISIS IF THE WAR CONTINUES AND ESCALATES. AS A MAJOR COPPER EXPORTER, ZAMBIA IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AFRICAN NATIONS ECONOMICALLY.

23. MOZAMBIQUE: (I REALIZE JAPAN'S NOT HAVING RELATIONS MAY POSE PROBLEMS.) THE MAIN ADVANTAGE OF GOING TO MOZAMBIQUE WOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE AN INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING CLOSER TIES WITH A NEW AFRICAN NATION WHICH IS SEEKING TO DIVERSIFY ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS. HOWEVER, MOZAMBIQUE STILL HAS CLOSER TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA THAN DO TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA; AND ESTABLISHING MEANINGFUL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TIES WITH IT IS BOUND TO BE A SLOW PROCESS. AS THE HOST TO ZANU FORCES, IT HAS BEEN MOST IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED IN THE RHODESIA CONFLICT, YET HAS PLAYED A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS.

24. KENYA: THE MAIN REASON FOR GOING TO KENYA WOULD BE THAT IT IS AN ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT, RELATIVELY CONSERVATIVE AND CAPITALIST-ORIENTED STATE. SUCH COUNTRIES LOOK TO THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES AS SUPPORTERS, AND ARE CONCERNED THAT OUR ATTENTION HAS SHIFTED FROM THEM TO THE TROUBLE SPOTS. THE MAJOR DISADVANTAGE IN VISITING KENYA WOULD BE THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE HORN MIGHT DOMINATE POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS--AN ISSUE ON WHICH JAPAN MAY WISH

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TO MAINTAIN ITS DISTANCE.

25. NIGERIA: AS AN OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRY, NIGERIA IS IMPORTANT ECONOMICALLY. IT HAS PLAYED AN ACTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN NEGOTIATIONS. ITS ROLE AT THE UN HAS BEEN ENHANCED BY ITS MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE

AGAINST APARTHEID. IT PLAYS AN IMPORTANT PART IN POLITICS ON THE CONTINENT. IN CHAIRING THE OAU MEDIATION COMMITTEE, IT HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATING MANY DISPUTES, INCLUDING THE ZAIRE/ANGOLA BORDER PROBLEM AND THE HORN. ON THE TRADE SIDE, IT TOOK THE LEAD IN NEGOTIATIONS ESTABLISHING THE LOME CONVENTION WITH THE EC-9. WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL ECONOMIC TALKS WITH NIGERIA. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.

26. IVORY COAST AND/OR SENEGAL: IT IS IMPORTANT TO TOUCH BASE WITH ONE OF THESE TWO LEADERS OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICA. BOTH ARE MODERATE AND, LIKE KENYA, NEED REASSURANCE ON OUTSIDE POWERS' INTEREST. IVORY COAST IS THE MORE DYNAMIC ECONOMICALLY, AND DISCUSSIONS THERE WOULD TEND TO FOCUS ON BUSINESS. SENEGAL IS MORE INVOLVED IN AFRICAN POLITICS AND AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY--INCLUDING NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES.

27. UPPER VOLTA: THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE SAHELIAN STATES' REGIONAL ORGANIZATION (CILSS) IS IN OUAGADOUGOU. A STOP HERE WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER JAPAN WANTS TO DEMONSTRATE INTEREST IN THE SAHEL'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT.

28. TWO COUNTRIES THAT I WOULD NOT RECOMMEND THE FOREIGN MINISTER VISIT ARE SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAIRE. A HIGH-LEVEL VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE REGARDED BY MANY AFRICAN CONFIDENTIAL

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STATES AS IMPLYING SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME. AFRICAN EXPECTATIONS WOULD BE THAT JAPAN WOULD STRONGLY CONDEMN APARTHEID DURING ANY VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA AND WOULD ANNOUNCE NEW POLICIES CONSISTENT WITH THAT POSITION. AT THE SAME TIME, IF A VISIT IS NOT MADE TO SOUTH AFRICA, IT IS NOT LIKELY TO BE A MAJOR POLITICAL CONCERN TO THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES VISITED. RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA ARE FOREMOST IN THE THINKING OF THE FRONT LINE AND OTHER AFRICAN STATES.

29. THE SERIOUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN ZAIRE AND THOSE CAUSED BY THE ZAIRE/ANGOLA HOSTILITIES ARE PROBABLY SOMETHING YOU WOULD WANT TO AVOID AT THIS TIME.

30. I AM ENCLOSING A COPY OF SECRETARY VANCE'S RECENT SPEECH SETTING OUT THE BASIC GUIDELINES OF OUR AFRICA POLICY AS WELL AS DESCRIBING THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON CURRENT CRITICAL AFRICAN ISSUES.

31. I AM CERTAIN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S TRIP WILL BE A PRODUCTIVE ONE. LET ME KNOW IF THERE IS ANYTHING MORE I CAN DO. VANCE

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